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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the politics of “illegal logging” through a case study from 
Vietnam. The study analyzes national-level forest politics and political economic 
dynamics on the ground. Its findings suggest that central government efforts to 
consolidate its authority over forests and public concerns over deforestation lead to 
the criminalization of much commercial logging, thus providing the grounds for 
powerful wholesalers and brokers to control the timber trade. These interactions 
between local political economy and national politics may be a more general 
dynamic of illegal logging, with important implications for Forest Law Enforcement 
and Governance (FLEG) initiatives worldwide. 
 
Keywords: Illegal logging, forest politics, political economy, commodity chain 
analysis, Vietnam, Southeast Asia 
 
 
Introduction 
“Illegal logging” has become a key issue in international forest policy.1 In the late 
1990s the volume of illegally harvested logs was reportedly higher than that of 
legally extracted timber in many Southeast Asian countries (Tacconi et al., 2003). 
Illegal activities accounted for 80 percent of all logging in the Brazilian Amazon and 
Bolivia, and occurred in relation to over half of all logging licenses in Cameroon 
(Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002). Moreover, in the early 2000s governments around the 
world committed to a series of agreements and action plans, known as Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiatives, which aim to solve the problem of 
the widespread failure of forest governance characterized by “illegal logging”, 
“illegal trade”, and “corruption” (Task Force and Advisory Group, 2003). The 
International Tropical Timber Council adopted decisions to focus on forest law 
enforcement at its sessions, echoed by similar calls from the United Nations Forum 
on Forests and the Sixth Conference of Parties of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Regional Ministerial Meetings convened for Southeast Asia, West Africa, 
and North Asia and declared combat against illegal activities and forest crimes an 
urgent priority. 
 
These reports and initiatives raise important questions about the nature of illegal 
logging, its causes and potential strategies to tackle the issue. Recent studies have 
suggested conflicting answers to these questions, as different explanatory 
frameworks have informed them. The frameworks diverge in their treatment of 
government law, as they take different stances on the legitimacy and suitability of 
what government laws define as “illegal”. They make varying assumptions about 
the nature of prevalent forest use practices, in particular the relative significance of 
small-scale activities versus large concessions. They are also at variance in 
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identifying underlying causes and driving forces. In addition, the frameworks 
emphasize different concerns in relation to forests and their use. As a result, they 
propose different strategies for tackling illegal logging. 
 
In this paper, we distinguish between three explanatory frameworks to explain 
illegal logging in Vietnam.2 The first centers on lack of compliance with forest 
regulations. Illegal practices constitute “criminal acts” (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002: 
10) and are sufficiently isolated and identifiable, such as illegal practices undertaken 
by large concessionaires. They occur mostly for private economic gain but are 
further compounded by governance problems of enforcement. Private actors employ 
illegal practices “when the benefits derived from violating the law [...] exceed the 
costs of non-compliance” (Tacconi et al., 2003). The cost of non-compliance, in turn, 
is low because of a “weak state” (Tacconi et al., 2003), “abuse of power” (ibid.), 
“corruption” (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002), or the “timber culture” of traditional 
foresters (FAO, 2001). These illegal practices are a concern because they represent a 
“major threat to global forest resources” (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002) and a “threat 
to global biodiversity” (Laurance, 2004). They also cause the state to lose important 
financial revenue (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Tacconi et al., 2003). The strategy for 
tackling illegal logging is legal enforcement, as neatly summarized by Laurance 
(2004: 400): ratification of international anti-corruption agreements, enactment of 
suitable legislation, improvement of  law enforcement and education of the private 
sector and civil society. Enforcement may involve the media and NGOs as 
watchdogs (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Brown and Luttrell, 2004). It may also enlist 
local communities as those can help “prevent and detect forest problems more 
reliably, and at lower cost, than the state alone” (Brunner et al., 1999: 2). 
 
The second framework emphasizes the political economic dynamics underlying 
logging practices. It questions the appropriateness of forest regulations, pointing out 
that complex regulations make it difficult for local people to comply with them 
(Richards et al., 2003). In the words of Colchester (2006: 46), “[i]llegal forest use is as 
much the result of the inappropriateness of the laws themselves, as any tendency of 
criminality on the part of community members”. The implicit assumption is that 
timber cutting largely takes the form of small-scale activities undertaken, supported, 
or tolerated by villagers. Nevertheless, villagers’ activities are part of “a complex 
economic and political system involving multiple stakeholders” (Casson and 
Obidzinski, 2002: 2133). Patron-client relations ensnare entrepreneurs, state officials, 
and villagers, forming powerful networks that cut across the boundary between 
state and society (McCarthy, 2002b; Wollenberg et al., 2006). The primary concern in 
this framework is that powerful outsiders and buyers in overseas markets profit the 
most from illegal activities, drastically limiting the benefits captured by rural people, 
especially the poor (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002). The appropriate response is not 
to enforce the law but to empower local people through a rights-based approach, 
lowering “barriers to legality” for small-scale forest operations (Richards et al., 2003) 
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and drawing on notions of human and indigenous rights to enhance people’s access 
to forest and the law (Colchester, 2006).  
 
The third framework does not center on forest use practices but puts the spotlight on 
the emergence of public and state concerns over illegal logging.3  In other words, the 
focus is on the “talk of illegality” and criminalization instead of illegal practice itself, 
as “actions that result in harm are not intrinsically criminal” (Pendleton 1997: 182). 
Like the second framework, the third sees forest use as small-scale operations 
undertaken, supported, or tolerated by villagers and often connected with the 
corrupt practices of local state officials. Yet in contrast to the second, this framework 
focuses on shake-ups in the relations of authority among politico-legal institutions. 
The causes of the increased public and state attention to illegal logging relate to 
democratization and decentralization trends and the promotion of rule by law and 
rights-based approaches (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002; Smith et al., 2003). For 
example, when key government powers are decentralized, central governments 
struggle to assert their authority over rural areas in general, and forests in particular 
(Smith et al., 2003). Local governments, in turn, actively embrace their new powers 
and seek to increase them in order to consolidate their control over valuable 
resources and generate economic rents for local budgets and officials (Casson and 
Obidzinski, 2002; McCarthy, 2002a). The main concern in this framework, therefore, 
primarily lies with the exercise of authority and legitimate relations of authority over 
forests. Correspondingly, efforts to tackle illegal logging seek to modify authority 
relations, offering support to either central governments (Smith et al., 2003), local 
governments (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002), or customary institutions (Colchester, 
2006). 
 
This paper explores the analytical power of the three explanatory frameworks and 
their implications for forest policy by looking at illegal logging in Vietnam. We seek 
to derive insights into the dynamics of illegal logging by combining in-depth 
analysis of political economic dynamics at the local level with attention to national 
policy and politics in Vietnam.4  The examination of national forest policy and 
politics locates the recent concern over illegal logging in relation to broader changes 
in the exercise of authority over forests and rural people. The in-depth analysis of a 
particular commodity chain in northern Vietnam traces logs from their point of 
extraction by upland villagers to wholesalers in the Red River Delta near Hanoi, the 
capital city, and undertakes a commodity chain analysis, as outlined in Ribot (1998), 
in order to unearth the political economic dynamics surrounding illegal operations 
on the ground.5 
 
The paper argues that the rise of illegal logging in Vietnam and beyond may have as 
much to do with local-level political economic dynamics as forest politics at the 
national level. These interactions between local struggles over forest use and 
national-level contestations over authority, we surmise, may be a more general 
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dynamic of illegal logging – despite the particularities of Vietnam6 and our focus on 
a case characterized by small-scale operations undertaken by villagers. We argue 
that the criminalization of much commercial logging provides the grounds for 
wholesalers and powerful brokers to control the timber trade. The criminalization 
has resulted from efforts by central government to consolidate its authority over 
forests in the wake of radical policy reforms as well as public concern over 
deforestation. We turn first to criminalization and national forest politics in the 
following empirical analysis. 
 
Forest policy and politics in Vietnam 
Policy: Allocating forestland and “closing the forest gates” 
Vietnam’s forest policy underwent radical changes in the 1990s. From the 1960s to 
the 1980s, forests were under direct state management (Sikor, 1998; Nguyen et al., 
2001). The central government and provincial authorities established State Forest 
Enterprises to handle forest operations. The Enterprises cut trees, processed them, 
and shipped the logs according to quotas assigned to them by central and provincial 
forest agencies. They extracted timber primarily to supply national construction 
requirements and to generate foreign exchange earnings.  
 
The 1990s saw a rapid flurry of new laws and directives in the forestry sector. Policy 
reforms began with the Forestry Sector Review, conducted under the Tropical 
Forestry Action program assisted by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN), which resulted in the 1991 
Forest Protection and Development Law. The impetus for the reforms came from 
much broader changes in Vietnamese government policy, however. In the late 1980s, 
the government had responded to the deterioration of living standards and local-
level changes in economic practices by implementing an ambitious program of 
“economic renovation” (doi moi) (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996). The program radically 
altered the way central government wanted to exercise authority over rural areas, 
among other things. A key element in the new approach to rural areas was the 1993 
Land Law, which substantially widened the bundles of rights accorded to 
landholders (Sikor, 2004). 
 
The changes to forest policy comprised three broad areas. First, the central 
government mandated the allocation of forestland previously managed by the state 
to households, public organizations and state units in 1994. This devolution not only 
put households on the same legal footing as the powerful State Forest Enterprises, 
but was also expected to make the Enterprises more independent of the state in their 
operation. The new landholders received “land use right certificates” which entitled 
them to use forestland for 50 years for production purposes. By the end of 2006, the 
government had transferred 30 percent of all forestland in Vietnam to households 
and local associations. State units such as management boards, State Forest 
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Enterprises and local authorities held certificates to the remaining 70 percent (Forest 
Protection Department, 2007). At the same time, the central government gradually 
strengthened the capacity of the Forest Protection Department, known as kiem lam in 
Vietnam, to oversee forest managers. The national Forest Protection Department 
operated offices at provincial and district levels. Its primary mandate was to enforce 
compliance with government forest regulations. 
 
Second, the reforms replaced the narrow focus on timber production with a new 
commitment to multi-purpose forestry and sustainable forest management. From 
then on, the objectives of forest management included protecting critical watersheds 
and conserving nature in addition to supplying timber. This diversification was a 
response to the deforestation and forest degradation of the past. It also reflected the 
increasing significance of hydropower as a source of energy and the new influence 
of international conservation organizations (Sikor, 2001; Zingerli, 2005). In fact, the 
Ministry of Forestry stated in 1991 that “the most important key issue in Vietnam is 
protection” (Ministry of Forestry 1991: 91).7  It banned timber exploitation in a large 
share of the country’s forest in 1993, a move it called “closing the forest gates”. By 
the late 1990s, central government had extended the logging ban to 4.8 million 
hectares, more than half of the country’s natural forest (FAO 2001: 10). 
 
Third, the distribution of authority over forests proved highly contentious in the 
1990s as provincial governments increasingly asserted claims to forests. These claims 
caused the central government to issue Decision 245 on decentralization in the 
forestry sector in 1998, defining the powers and responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development and provincial governments. Nevertheless, 
contestations about authority over forests continued. For example, provincial 
governments took significant liberties in implementing the national guidelines on 
forestland allocation. In the late 1990s, Dak Lak province started to allocate natural 
forest to households despite strong reservations on the part of the Ministry (Sikor et 
al., 2005). In 2001, Son La province allocated a large share of its provincial natural 
forest to households and communities in a massive campaign before a revised Forest 
Law provided for such a possibility (Nguyen, 2003).8  
 
Devolution, the shift to multi-purpose forestry and decentralization implied a 
massive challenge to central government with respect to its authority over forests. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development now had to deal with 
numerous smallholders and increasingly independent State Forest Enterprises as 
forest managers. It had to work with provincial governments that were increasingly 
assertive of their interests and powers. Moreover, it could no longer rely on 
production quotas as its main instrument for controlling forest managers and lower-
level state units.  
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In reaction, the central government sought to consolidate its authority over forest on 
a new basis. First, it created an elaborate legal framework of what was not allowable 
in forest management. For example, a decree issued in 1992 published a long list of 
fines applicable to the extraction and transportation of different kinds and amounts 
of wood without the required permits. Second, it expanded the powers and 
capacities of the Forest Protection Department to enforce the legal framework. For 
example, a decision by the Deputy Prime Minister in 1997 urged kiem lam and police 
forces to “check and arrest individuals and organizations caught destroying forest”. 
Third, the central government increasingly provided financial incentives to forest 
managers and provincial authorities as a means of influencing their actions. Most 
prominently, it announced the “Five Million Hectare Program” in 1998, through 
which it aimed at raising Vietnam’s forest cover from 30 to 43 per cent, channelling a 
large share of central government funds for rural areas into tree planting and forest 
protection. 
 
Politics: the lam tac (forest hijackers) 
The central government resorted to directive measures to assert its authority over 
Vietnam’s forests as it felt uneasy about its ability to exercise control over forest use 
at the local level. Already in 1995 it had revoked the previous year’s call to allocate 
natural forest to households, instead calling upon State Forest Enterprises to make 
short-term protection contracts with households (Sikor, 2001). This severely limited 
the ability of villagers to harvest timber legally. Moreover, it sought to tighten 
controls over the timber trade. In 1992, the Ministry of Forestry stopped granting 
new export permits and withdrew those already granted for roundwood and 
lumber. In 1993, central government mandated the establishment of thousands of 
checkpoints spanning Vietnam’s major roads. In addition, it developed the Forest 
Protection Department into a police-like agency under central control, giving it 
independent status from the Ministry of Forestry in 1994, and removed provincial 
kiem lam agencies from the Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
strengthening central control over provincial and district units. Therefore, by the 
late-1990s most of the logging taking place in Vietnam had been declared illegal, and 
a police-like force was in place to prevent it.  
 
Despite the ban, logging was widespread in the late 1990s, even though much of it 
was illegal.9 The Asian Development Bank estimated in 2000 that illegal extraction 
accounted for 70 percent of the total log supply in Vietnam (Asian Development 
Bank, 2000 cited in McElwee, 2004).10 The kiem lam uncovered more than 400,000 
violations of forest regulations between 1992 and 1997 (Forest Protection 
Department, 1998 cited by McElwee, 2004). Illegal activities were endemic, the Forest 
Protection Department argued, because it did not have the capacity to enforce forest 
regulations. The head of the national kiem lam noted that “Our force is very thin, 
missing people, and weak [...], and our equipment is poor” (Forest Protection 
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Department, 1998 cited in McElwee, 2004). Moreover, the kiem lam saw itself 
confronting logging crews and traders who did not hesitate to use violence against 
field officers. Vietnam’s daily newspapers repeatedly reported conflicts in which 
forest protection officers were injured.11 
 
These newspaper reports illustrate how illegal logging became the concern of the 
general Vietnamese public. The average Vietnamese began to view illegal activities 
as the main culprit in deforestation rather than the rotational cultivation practices of 
ethnic minority people, which had been the conventional perception. Vietnam’s 
national media sent out reporters to hunt for stories on illegal practices. Together 
with the kiem lam they even coined a new term to refer to illegal loggers – lam tac, 
which translates literally as “forest hijackers”. In contrast, kiem lam officers fared well 
in the media, as they conducted a “fight for all [...], for with the country despoiled 
then there’s no country for tomorrow” (Thanh Long, 2000 cited in McElwee, 2004). In 
a program on national television, a local kiem lam officer was portrayed as a “forest 
queen”, ready to give her life to protect the forest (Hoang, 2007). 
 
Yet the press also detected that many lam tac collaborated with local government 
officials, among them kiem lam staff.12 One of the most widely discussed cases 
occurred in Tanh Linh district in the southern province of Binh Thuan between 1993 
and 1995, when local state officials oversaw the illegal extraction of 53,000 m³ of trees 
in protected forests for a total value of more than USD 1.5 million. The logging 
became public years later only after a retired government official had written 74 
reports to Hanoi. The case resulted in court proceedings against 36 people, including 
29 state officials at the district and provincial levels. The chairman of the provincial 
People’s Committee was forced out of office in the wake of the scandal (VNS, 1999a 
cited in McElwee, 2004). 
 
This case illustrates two important points about the politics of illegal logging in 
Vietnam. First, the attention given to illegal activities involving government officials 
was so massive because it connected with public outrage over corruption in other 
sectors. In the late 1990s, a series of corruption scandals exposed the complicity of 
state officials in illegal business dealings (Gainsborough, 2003). Corruption was 
widely perceived as the main culprit in undesirable developments associated with 
the commercialization of Vietnam’s economy such as the growing inequality 
between rich and poor. The public expected the government to prosecute corruptive 
practices as a way of reinstalling some of the moral order that had been lost with doi 
moi (Luong, 2007). Accordingly, the media portrayed the loggers as lam tac, that is 
“forest hijackers”, the term carrying the implication that forest was national heritage. 
Much of the public outcry about illegal logging, therefore, originated from a more 
general disapproval of government officials’ predatory practices. 
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Second, illegal logging provided a template against which “good government” could 
be constructed by central government. The attention to illegal operations ignored or 
assisted by local state officials helped to strengthen the legitimacy of central 
government concerns over forest. Illegal logging thus served the efforts of central 
government to assert its authority over rural areas more generally. This became most 
apparent when the Prime Minister issued a decree in March 2006 that made 
provincial leaders personally responsible for illegal operations in their provinces. 
 
A khao timber commodity chain in northern Vietnam 
Thus the Vietnamese government had declared much of commercial logging illegal 
by the late 1990s. This logging ban exerted a direct influence on the political 
economic dynamics of logging operations on the ground, as we show in the 
following case study from the northern uplands. Our inquiry takes the form of a 
commodity chain analysis, as laid out in Ribot (1998). We investigate the social 
actors involved in the chain, the distribution of benefits and risks among them, and 
the mechanisms by which they gain benefits from logs and control their distribution. 
In this way, we demonstrate how the logging ban shaped the political economy of 
logging on the ground, providing the basis on which some actors could not only 
become involved in the timber trade but also reap significant financial gains from it. 
 
Background 
The village of Ban Chanh13 is located at the end of a small road connecting the 
commune of Tan Da with the district town of Bac Minh district, the provincial 
township of Hoa Binh, and eventually Hanoi (see Figure 1). Its inhabitants belong to 
the Dao, an ethnic group accounting for some 621,000 people in Vietnam in 1999 
(General Statistics Office, 2007). A few Dao households founded the village in 1958 
when they moved into the upper watershed of a small tributary to the Da river. By 
2004, the village population had grown to 247 people living in 50 households. They 
were primarily engaged in subsistence-oriented agriculture, growing rice in the 
valley and cassava and corn on the slopes. Life was not easy for them, as they 
typically ran out of rice between two and four months a year. 
 
The villagers of Ban Chanh had long used the forest above their village for 
subsistence purposes. They had cleared forest for the rotational cultivation of 
agricultural crops and extracted timber, fuelwood and other products from it. Over 
time, secondary regrowth had replaced primary forest, and the people had removed 
the most valuable trees. Their right to use of the forest found recognition by the 
surrounding villages, including the Muong villagers in Cuu village, located about 
five km away on the other side of the forest.14  The Muong from Cuu maintained a 
good relationship with the Dao of Ban Chanh, accepting their control over the forest. 
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Figure 1. Map of the research area 
 
Map compiled by Daniel Müller  
 
The kiem lam station of Bac Minh district also recognized villagers’ control over the 
forest, although it possessed legal authority over the forest. Its officers implemented 
forestland allocation in 1995, assigning individual forestland parcels to all 
households. The kiem lam was also in charge of enforcing the protection of the forest 
after the provincial authorities declared the area a highly critical watershed in 2001. 
Yet enforcement was lacking in practice, as forest protection officers rarely went up 
to Ban Chanh and never walked the slopes to inspect the forest from close to. 
Villagers continued to work their fields in the forest wherever they considered it 
suitable, ignoring the 1995 allocations. They even began to cut timber for sale, 
selecting khao (phoebe pallida nees) trees because there was a demand for them. 
 
One of the places that timber was sold was Huu Bang, a commune located in Thach 
That district of Ha Tay province, about 100 km from Ban Chanh (see Figure 1). As 
Hanoi was a mere 20 km away, the people of Huu Bang benefited from the rapid 
increase in the urban demand for construction wood and furniture in the 1990s. The 
commune became home to a strong market for logs brought from various regions of 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and a large number of furniture workshops supplying 
consumers in Hanoi and the Red River Delta. Some 80 percent of all households 
living in the commune specialized in furniture-making, as revealed by our market 
survey. 
 
Actors 
In 2004, many people participated in the khao timber commodity chain emanating 
from Ban Chanh. These included villagers, Muong woodcutters, a trader/transporter, 
wholesalers/processors, various kinds of local state officials and two “lawmakers” 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Relationships among actors in the khao timber trade 
 
Muong woodcutters Villagers
Village and commune officials
Kiem lam , public security 
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division in Bac Minh district
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Tax and market management 
divisions of Thach That district
Lawmaker
Anh Mot
Lawmaker
Anh Hai
Trader/transporter
Wholesalers
Kiem lam , police for economic 
affairs of Hoa Binh township
Kiem lam  and public security 
forces of Ky Son and Luong 
Son districts
Kiem lam  and public security 
forces of Quoc Oai and Thach 
That districts
Legend:
Timber               Labor          Permits and controls        
Payments            Influence         
 
Source: The authors 
 
Villagers:  Small groups of villagers cut khao trees from the forest above Ban Chanh in 
small groups using hand-operated saws. Almost all healthy men between age 15 and 
60 took part in cutting trees. After sawing the trees into large planks, the men used 
water buffaloes to haul the planks back to their village, sometimes with the help of 
their wives or mothers. Back in the village, they kept the logs hidden from commune 
officials and forest protection officers.  
 
Muong woodcutters:  Strong young Muong men from a nearby village, between 20 
and 40 years old, were hired by the villagers as woodcutters to help with the cutting 
and sawing, which required at least two strong men working together. 
  
Trader/transporter:  Villagers sold the timber to a trader, Anh Nga. Anh Nga was a 
resident of the district town, where he owned a big house. He had built another 
small house near the main road in Ban Chanh, from which to buy timber from the 
villagers and sell them essential goods and agricultural inputs. Anh Nga owned two 
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trucks which he used to transport khao logs to the lowland market in Huu Bang 
commune (see Figure 1). There he sold the logs to some wholesalers.15  
  
Wholesalers/processors:  There were about 30 wholesalers in Huu Bang commune, 
many of which also processed logs in small sawmills. Anh Nga sold his logs to some 
of these. They purchased timber not only from across northern and central Vietnam 
but also from Laos and Cambodia. They sold processed and unprocessed logs to 
furniture workshops and retailers in the commune, surrounding villages, and Hanoi. 
  
Local government officials:  As Anh Nga transported khao logs from Ban Chanh to Huu 
Bang, his trucks had to pass a series of inspections and checkpoints (see Figure 2). 
The inspections began right in the village, where the village and commune 
chairmen, the commune security officer and the local forest officer had the mandate 
to verify the origins of the wood for transportation and trade. After leaving the 
village, the trucks typically passed through four checkpoints run by different 
agencies of Bac Minh district: kiem lam, public security forces, traffic police, and the 
tax division. Reaching the provincial township of Hoa Binh, the trucks had to 
maneuver their way through another series of fixed and mobile checkpoints, 
including some established by the provincial government (kiem lam and the police 
concerned with economic affairs, special affairs, and traffic regulation) and others 
under the mandate of the township government (kiem lam, traffic police, and the 
economic affairs department). Leaving the township, the trucks still had to pass 
through two districts in Hoa Binh province and another two in Ha Tay province 
before they reached Huu Bang (see Figure 1). In each district, the trucks had to deal 
with a fixed and a mobile checkpoint run by the district public security forces and 
kiem lam. The trucks, therefore, maneuvered their way through a long series of 
checkpoints, each managed by three or four people. Anh Nga estimated that in 2004 
he had to lubricate a truck’s journey by paying off an average of 23 officials. 
  
Lawmakers:  Two “lawmakers” (lam luat in Vietnamese), took care of most of the 
bribery, contacting the relevant government officials over the phone, visiting them at 
their homes, or meeting them at secret places. One lawmaker, Anh Mot, lived in the 
provincial township of Hoa Binh, the other one, Anh Hai, in the provincial township 
of Ha Tay. Both had fathers serving in high-ranking positions in provincial 
government. The lawmakers made sure that the trucks loaded with illegal logs were 
not stopped at any checkpoint. It was not uncommon for them to arrange safe 
passage for a dozen trucks driving in convoy. Like many other traders, Anh Nga 
employed the lawmakers’ services to get his logs to Huu Bang, working with Anh 
Mot to smooth things in Hoa Binh province and with Anh Hai to do the same in Ha 
Tay province. Anh Nga had to pay “service fees” to them in return.  
  
The khao commodity chain emanating from Ban Chanh thus included a long series of 
actors. Physical khao log transactions involved villagers in Ban Chanh, Muong 
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woodcutters from a nearby village, the trader/transporter and a number of 
wholesalers/processors. Yet these were embedded in a wider network of political 
economic transactions, bringing in a variety of local government officials and two 
lawmakers. All these actors participated in the khao timber trade, yet not on equal 
terms, as the next section shows. 
 
Distribution of benefits and risks among actors 
The actors involved in the khao commodity chain derived different benefits and faced 
different risks. If one looks at income only, it appears that three groups benefited 
from the timber more or less equally: villagers and Muong woodcutters; the trader 
and wholesalers; and local government officials and lawmakers (see Figure 3). Yet if 
one also considers the number of people in each group, the required labor input and 
risks incurred, it becomes clear that the distribution of benefits was highly skewed in 
favor of the lawmakers, wholesalers, and local government officials (see Table 1). 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of total income among actors 
Villagers
18%
Muong 
woodcutters
12%
Trader
9%Wholesalers
22%
Officials
34%
Lawmakers
5%
 
Source: The authors 
 
Villagers derived the smallest cash income from khao timber although they worked 
more than any of the other. The average return for a day’s labor by a villager on 
timber logging was a mere 29,000 VND, or about 1.80 USD. Moreover, villagers 
incurred the risk of physical injury when cutting, sawing, and hauling logs, and 
there was the danger that forest protection officers would detect logs kept in the 
village. None of them had ever been fined, although there was always the threat of 
fines. Some of them had had their logs confiscated by kiem lam officers. However, 
income from khao extraction made an important contribution to villagers’ 
livelihoods. A random survey of village households conducted by us in 2004 
revealed that on average they derived 60 per cent of their total cash income from 
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timber, including khao. In the village, timber income was the most important source 
of cash. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of risks, expenses, and cash benefits among social actors 
 Social risks Labor expenses Cash expenses Cash benefits 
Village 
woodcutters 
Fines, physical 
injury (debts) 
120 labor days 2.4 million VND 
for hiring Muong 
woodcutters; 0.15 
million VND for 
buffalo rental 
6 million VND 
gross revenues; 
3.45 million VND 
income; 28,750 
VND/labor day 
Migrant 
woodcutters 
Physical injury 48 labor days None 2.4 million gross 
revenues and 
income; 50,000 
VND/labor day  
Trader/transporter High risk of 
detection; legal 
prosecution 
1 night for 
transport, 3-4 
days for 
preparation 
6 million VND for 
purchase of 
timber; 0.4 million 
VND for loading; 
7.5 million VND 
for bribes; 1.2 
million VND for 
gasoline. Total 
expenses: 15.1 
million VND   
16.8 million VND 
gross revenues; 
1.7 million VND 
income 
Wholesaler  Checks on origin 
of logs by various 
government 
agencies 
 
3-5 days to sell 
timber 
16.8 million VND 
for purchase of 
timber; 50,000 
VND for bribes.  
Total expenses: 
16.85 million 
VND 
21 million VND 
gross revenues; 
4.15 million VND 
income 
Local government 
officials 
Detection and 
punishment 
None No financial 
expense involved 
6.55 million VND 
gross revenues 
and income; 
285,000 VND per 
capita 
Lawmakers Detection and 
punishment 
Some, but 
difficult to 
attribute to 
particular load 
2.5 million VND 
for bribes  
3.5 million gross 
revenues; 1 
million VND 
income; 0.5 
million VND 
income per capita 
Note: The calculations are made for a truckload of six cubic meters of khao timber. One US 
dollar is equivalent to about 16,000 Vietnam Dong (VND). We use the term “income” to 
refer to gross margins, which are the difference between gross revenues and all variable 
costs excluding household labor. For a complete calculation of income, we would need to 
subtract the costs of household labor and capital depreciation. 
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In Ban Chanh, the benefits derived from khao varied significantly among households. 
Households with several adult laborers and which owned a water buffalo benefited 
more than those with only one adult laborer and/or no buffalo. Some of the latter 
kind had even fallen into debt after hiring Muong woodcutters and buffaloes to cut 
and haul timber. Their earnings turned out not to cover their expenses and 
repayment of loans they had initially taken out to finance their logging activities. 
  
Muong woodcutters received a small share of the overall income. Yet on average they 
achieved significant returns for their labor, as villagers paid them 50,000 VND (3.30 
USD) per day of work. Like the villagers, they faced the risk of physical injury. The 
likelihood that forest protection officers would detect and fine them was low, 
however, as they did not bring logs home. 
  
Anh Nga, the trader cum transporter, captured a smaller share of the overall income, 
yet he worked alone and expended less labor than villagers and migrant 
woodcutters (see Table 1). In addition, he purchased timber not only in Ban Chanh 
but also in surrounding areas, the benefits of which are not included in Table 1. At 
the same time, he incurred a significant risk of detection and legal prosecution in his 
business, as the transport of timber was easy for local government officials to detect. 
If caught, he was subject to significant legal fines and was in danger of losing not 
only the timber but also his trucks and license for trading and transporting timber. 
This almost happened at the end of 2004, when public security police in Bac Minh 
district stopped his trucks loaded with illegal timber. The police detained the trucks 
for a month, during which he could not continue his business. The police eventually 
issued a fine of 60 million VND (3,750 USD) and confiscated all the logs.  
  
Wholesalers were significantly better off than Anh Nga; their share of the total income 
was twice the size of his. In addition, wholesalers received timber from locations 
across Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Furthermore, the risk of detection by law 
enforcement agencies was much lower for wholesalers than the trader, as reflected in 
the relatively small amount of money the former spent on bribes. Local government 
agencies occasionally checked the origins of their logs, but this was much less 
threatening than the many checkpoints Anh Nga had to pass through on his way 
from Ban Chanh to Huu Bang.  
  
Local government officials, taken together as a group, got the biggest piece of the pie. 
Each official received 285,000 VND on average; the same amount of money that a 
Muong woodcutter earned in six days, a villager in ten days of hard physical work, 
and an early-career government official in half a month. This led Anh Nga to 
comment: “As you know that the price down there [in Huu Bang] is twice the price it 
is here, you may think that I am very rich. In fact, almost all benefits are spread on 
the road”. By the latter he referred to the fact that about one third of total income 
accrued went to the local government officials managing checkpoints along the road 
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from Ban Chanh to Huu Bang. Yet officials from different state agencies did not 
benefit equally from the khao logs. Forest protection officers received the biggest 
bribes, followed by traffic police officers. Cadres in other agencies, such as the tax 
and economic affairs departments, received smaller amounts and were paid off less 
often. Officials at village and commune levels benefited least, as the trader often 
bypassed them.  
  
The officials faced a risk of detection, although this was low. They took care to 
arrange their dealings with the trader and lawmakers at secret places and in covert 
ways. Nonetheless a slight risk of detection remained, as illustrated by an event in 
late 2004. The head of the district kiem lam and some of his staff stopped a truck 
transporting ornamental trees extracted from a protected forest. When they asked 
the driver for a bribe, he pushed the recording button of his mobile phone secretly. 
The driver thus managed to tape his negotiations with the district head. After the 
incident the driver used the evidence to report the district head and his staff to the 
law enforcement officers, which eventually resulted in the transfer of the district 
head to another district and punishment of the staff involved. None of them were 
demoted from the kiem lam. 
  
The lawmakers received the smallest share, yet only had to divide it between the two 
of them. This meant that their income (equivalent to 31 US$) was almost double the 
average payment to a local government official. In addition, the lawmakers gained 
from many other timber transports passing through from other areas. They incurred 
some risk of detection, but neither had ever been reported or prosecuted, to our 
knowledge. 
  
The benefits from the khao logs, therefore, were distributed unevenly along the 
commodity chain. Villagers benefited the least and Muong woodcutters faired only 
marginally better. Various kinds of local government officials received more than a 
third of the total income, if one lumps them together in a group. The two lawmakers 
and the wholesalers benefited most. Both derived significant income from khao logs 
and incurred only minor risks. Why this was so is the subject of the following 
sections. 
 
Access and control: Villagers and Muong woodcutters 
Villagers exerted direct control over access to the forest above Ban Chanh (see Table 
2). They successfully claimed control of the use of the forest surrounding their 
village, although forest regulations accorded this to the Forest Protection 
Department. Yet the kiem lam did not even try to stop villagers from cutting down 
trees. Villagers commonly observed that the officers “never come down to the village 
to check for logging. They don’t care about us poor villagers, but about the trader”. 
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Moreover, villagers in Ban Chanh were free to cut khao trees in the forest wherever 
they wanted, regardless of their allocation to individual households in 1995.  
 
Nevertheless, villagers’ ability to exercise their right to timber trees depended on 
their access to labor and draft power. Labor was important because the cutting, 
sawing, and transporting of logs required the participation of healthy adult men. If 
households did not include these, they had to hire Muong woodcutters at significant 
cost, team up with other villagers, or work for them themselves at a relatively low 
daily rate (20-25,000 VND). A water buffalo was important because it provided the 
draft power needed to haul logs from the forest back to the village. Households 
without a buffalo had to hire one from a household which owned several, or team 
up with these or work for one. Access to timber, therefore, was most beneficial when 
households included a number of strong men and possessed a water buffalo. It was 
less profitable for households that lacked either. Some households that lacked both 
did not benefit at all. 
  
Muong living in the neighboring village did not have direct access to the forest 
surrounding Ban Chanh. Villagers refused outsiders the right to cut timber from Ban 
Chanh’s forest, bolstering the exclusion by reference to their customary rights to the 
forest as well as the legal titles conferred on them by the state in the 1995 allocation. 
As a result, the Muong could not engage in logging on their own account, even 
though they possessed sufficient labor and water buffaloes. They had to work for 
villagers as hired labor, or team up with them. Individual woodcutters, therefore, 
had developed long-term relationships with villagers as a strategy to maintain their 
access to the timber. This was also advantageous for villagers, as they valued the 
Muong’s technical skills and physical strength. 
 
Access and control: The trader and wholesalers 
Anh Nga, the trader, derived his benefits from khao timber logging by virtue of two 
factors. First, he controlled the purchase of timber, including khao from Ban Chanh. 
He was the only person living in the village offering to purchase logs. In addition, he 
had developed close relations with villagers to ensure a steady supply of logs. Anh 
Nga sold rice, salt, fertilizers, and other essentials to the villagers. He let them buy 
on credit when needed, and allowed them to run up debts for one or two years, 
asking them to repay their loans in logs instead of cash. The trader also entertained 
villagers at his house, showing movies on his color TV and inviting people for tea. In 
this way Anh Nga acquired a positive reputation with villagers, motivating them to 
sell their logs to him and to ignore occasional offers made by outsiders coming to 
Ban Chanh in search of timber.  
To, XP and T. Sikor, 2008                                                                                              DEV Working Paper 05      
 20 
 
Table 2: Mapping access to timber along the commodity chain 
 Mechanisms of access Mechanism of access control and 
maintenance 
Villagers • Direct control over forest access  • Customary regulations, threat of 
social sanctions 
 • Access to labor and draft power • Household labor capacity and 
buffalo ownership 
• Labor and buffalo hire 
• Social ties with other villagers 
Muong 
woodcutters 
• Access to villagers • Social ties with villagers 
Trader/transporter • Control of timber supply • Social ties with villagers 
• Credit arrangements with villagers  
 • Access to timber market • Ownerships of trucks 
• Social ties with wholesaler 
• Social ties with local officials 
• Social ties with lawmakers 
• Risk bearing 
• Control over market information  
 • Leverage over price paid to 
villagers 
• Control over timber supply (see 
above) 
• Access to timber market (see above) 
Wholesalers • Control over access to distribution 
network 
• Knowledge of demand 
• Social ties with retailers and 
carpenters 
• Selling logs on credit 
 • Access to capital • Ownership of physical assets 
• Credit arrangements with traders 
• Leverage over price paid to traders 
Local officials  • Leverage over timber trade • Permits and licenses 
• Threat of fines and legal 
prosecution 
• Mobile and fixed check points 
Lawmakers  • Control over access to local 
government officials  
• Kinship relations with high-ranking 
provincial officials 
• Social ties with local government 
officials 
• Formal work relations with other 
officials 
• Suppression of competitors 
 
  
Second, Anh Nga maintained access to the timber market. He had purchased two 
trucks for transporting timber so he did not have to depend on the services of others. 
He also maintained strong social ties with particular wholesalers in Huu Bang 
market, in the lowlands. When he made a deal with them, the wholesalers 
sometimes advanced cash to him if he needed it to purchase logs. Just as important 
were his close relations with a large number of local government officials, which 
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allowed him to obtain a permit for timber trading and reduce the risk of detection 
and punishment. Anh Nga had invested a lot in building long-term relationships 
with these local officials at district and provincial levels, including the two 
lawmakers. He paid them off every time he transported timber and brought them 
special “gifts” – usually envelopes stuffed with cash – on special occasions such as 
New Year and Independence Day. In Ban Chanh, he often hosted the kiem lam 
officers coming to the village at his house, becoming good friends with them over 
time. 
  
These two strategies allowed Anh Nga to exert leverage over the price he paid 
villagers for the logs. He was the only trader to whom villagers sold their logs, and 
he maintained the required access to the timber market. In addition, villagers simply 
lacked enough knowledge of the timber market to enable them to turn to other 
traders or negotiate a better price. Anh Nga, in consequence, was able to purchase 
the logs at a price favorable to himself. 
  
The wholesalers derived their benefits from khao timber due to their control over 
access to the distribution network of retailers and carpenters and their access to 
capital. Wholesalers controlled access to the distribution network through their 
knowledge of the downstream market for timber. They had also developed good 
relationships with many retailers and carpenters, and sold them timber on credit if 
needed. In addition, they maintained good connections with officials from the kiem 
lam and the market management and tax collection departments at the district and 
provincial levels. They visited the officials on a regular basis to chat and deliver 
“gifts”. They also paid the officials that showed up in their stores or warehouses. 
  
A second pillar of the wholesalers’ favorable position in the khao commodity chain 
was their access to capital. In 2004, all wholesalers owned significant physical assets 
such as stores and warehouses. Some even operated small sawmills. Occasionally 
they advanced money to local traders or let retailers buy on credit. Therefore they 
commanded significant capital. They had accumulated most of the capital over 
several years in the course of their operations. Most importantly, wholesalers 
colluded with each other in fixing the price paid for logs. This granted them leverage 
over the price paid to local traders, raising their profits in the business. 
 
Access and control: Local government officials and lawmakers 
Local government officials derived their significant share of the overall net income 
(see Figure 3) from their leverage over the timber trade. This leverage was the result 
of not only the official mandate conferred by their positions (such as power to grant 
or deny a logging permit or to detain a truck and confiscate logs transported without 
a permit), but also the unofficial powers associated with such positions (such as the 
power to notice or ignore illegal practices). Officials commonly asked for and 
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received bribes when issuing any of the numerous permits and licenses required by 
forest regulations. In addition, they expected traders, transporters, and wholesalers 
to pay them to turn a blind eye to their operations – not even bothering to ask 
whether these would be considered legal or illegal by the letter of the law. If the 
former failed to deliver the expected payments they would face the threat of hefty 
fines and legal prosecution, as illustrated by the experience of Anh Nga discussed 
above. Local government officials were also used to receiving visits and money to 
facilitate timber transportation from the two lawmakers.16 
   
The officials did not benefit equally from the khao timber trade. Their gain 
corresponded with the power conferred on them by their official position and their 
capacity to exercise these in practice. Kiem lam officers were mandated to stop a truck 
at any time if they suspected it of carrying timber, to fine transporters caught 
without a permit, and to confiscate both. They also had the means to enforce their 
mandates, as they possessed the necessary staff and equipment. As a result, kiem lam 
officers tended to receive larger bribes than their colleagues in other departments. 
Anh Nga could not avoid paying the kiem lam, as he explained: “I cannot bypass 
them, as doing so would risk heavy fines from them [...]. To maintain my business in 
the long run, it’s better that I pay, even if they don’t stop me.”  Second to kiem lam 
was the traffic police, which also operated mobile checkpoints along the road but 
could only stop a truck if its load exceeded the maximum allowable weight. Anh 
Nga only had to pay them if they actually stopped his trucks on the way to Huu 
Bang. He got away without paying if he did not encounter a checkpoint on the road. 
In contrast, village and commune officials made surprisingly little money from the 
timber logging, although they witnessed it right in front of their doors. They did not 
possess official powers to detain trucks, confiscate timber, or fine transporters 
without permits, as they had to transfer all cases to the district kiem lam. 
  
In addition, higher-ranking officials seemed to make more money from the timber 
trade than those working in lower positions. A significant share of bribes received by 
regular staff eventually made its way up to their superiors. High-ranking officials 
commonly received “gifts” from their staff on several occasions a year. In addition, 
regular officials had had to bribe those responsible for recruitment with a significant 
amount of money to get into their jobs initially. The bribe required to secure a 
lucrative job was significant, going into thousands of USD.17   
  
The lawmakers, finally, benefited from the khao timber trade by controlling access to 
local government officials. Both lawmakers were able to offer these brokering 
services, mainly because their fathers served in high-ranking positions in the 
administrations of Hoa Binh and Ha Tay provinces. Anh Mot and Anh Hai had used 
their kinship relations and expended significant effort and money to develop stable 
relationships with a wide range of local government officials, providing them with 
the necessary network to arrange timber deals and safety nets in case something 
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went wrong. In addition, they took advantage of their formal positions in the 
provincial administrations to ease communication with officials at district and 
commune levels. Furthermore, both Anh Mot and Anh Hai had, over time, claimed 
the timber trade as their particular “territory”, within which they monopolized 
control over access to the officials involved. Anh Nga, the trader, had no choice but 
enlist their services in making the transport of logs from Ban Chanh to Huu Bang 
possible. This control allowed the lawmakers to derive the greatest benefit from the 
timber trade of all the actors, as noted above. 
  
In sum, the logging ban played directly into the hands of the wholesalers, the two 
lawmakers, various government officials, and the trader/transporter. The 
criminalization of much commercial logging effectively created the basis for the 
wholesalers and the lawmakers to control the timber trade. The wholesalers 
dominated the trade by virtue of their access to capital, as the criminalization made 
it impossible for other actors to apply for bank loans to raise the capital needed to 
participate in the timber trade. The ban was also what made the service offered by 
the two lawmakers so valuable, as they had power over access to the local 
government officials who furnished the required permits and conducted their 
enforcement. Besides the wholesaler and lawmakers, the ban also benefited various 
government officials and the trader/transporter. The officials received payments 
which added significantly to their salaries, and the trader was able to monopolize 
the local timber trade. In stark contrast, the ban not only made it impossible for 
villagers to derive significant benefit from their direct control over forest access but 
also created the basis for highly unequal relationships with the trader/transporter 
and local government officials. In short, it was much more the ban than anything 
else that drove the illegal timber extraction and trade. 
 
Conclusions: the dynamics of illegal logging and implications for 
policy 
These empirical insights suggest that illegal logging in Vietnam has as much to do 
with the operation of political economic networks on the ground as central 
government concerns over the exercise of authority. In other words, the lam tac are as 
present and active at the local level (as real people) as on the national agenda (as an 
image). Local lam tac networks involve a variety of actors, inside and outside the 
state, who benefit unevenly from the timber trade. Wholesalers and high-level 
powerbrokers benefit the most from logging as the ban allows them to control the 
timber trade. The criminalization of commercial logging, therefore, has provided the 
grounds for the operation of powerful networks at the local level. It has resulted 
from efforts by the central government to assert its authority over forests in the wake 
of Vietnam’s forest reforms, combined with public concerns over deforestation and 
corruption. 
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These insights from Vietnam indicate the utility of combining the second and third 
explanatory frameworks discussed at the beginning of the paper in order to 
understand illegal logging in a setting characterized by small-scale activities and 
contested authority over forest. The focus in the first framework, on non-compliance 
with forest regulations, does not explain the social dynamics underlying illegal 
logging at both local and national levels. Locally, many actors engage in illegal 
activities, but they do so on very different grounds and derive very different 
benefits. Even more problematic is the lack of attention to the politics and premises 
informing government definitions of “illegality”.  
  
The second framework helps in analyzing the political economy of actual forest use, 
including its effects on the distribution of benefits among a variety of actors and 
ways by which some of the actors control logging activities. The political economic 
dynamics are likely to include patron-client relations between wholesalers and local 
traders (Casson and Obdzinski, 2002), the cooptation of customary leaders 
(McCarthy, 2002b), and enrollment of villagers (Colchester, 2006). They typically 
involve close connections between private entrepreneurs and local governments, as 
the entrepreneurs may sit in elected local assemblies (McCarthy, 2002a), exert 
political pressure on elected local government officials (Wollenberg et al., 2006) or 
help the officials establish themselves as local patrons in other ways (McCarthy, 
2002b). An important element, therefore, is corruption in its many guises (McElwee, 
2004), including the upward movement of bribes received by regular law 
enforcement officers to their superiors (McCarthy, 2002b). A significant actor not 
present in our case is the military, which tends to command the labor, equipment, 
and political connections required for illegal operations (Casson and Obdzinski, 
2002; McElwee, 2004). 
  
Yet our understanding of illegal logging would remain incomplete without attention 
to the criminalization of some forest uses occurring at the national level. Public and 
central government concerns over forest use arise not only in reaction to 
developments on the ground but also in response to other factors going much 
beyond forest use and forest policy (Pendleton, 1997). Central governments may 
tighten forest regulations and enact logging bans because they fear losing control 
over forest use in particular and rural people more generally (Smith et al., 2003). 
These fears may be nurtured by increasingly assertive local governments, which 
may interpret the powers received under decentralization programs more widely 
than the national government (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002). They may result in the 
use of relatively drastic policy measures such as logging bans without much explicit 
justification (cf. Brown et al., 2001). Moreover, they may encourage central 
governments to discuss illegal logging in the open, bringing about “a dramatic break 
from all previous global discussions on sustainable forest management” (Task Force 
and Advisory Group, 2003: 1). 
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Such an understanding of illegal logging, we surmise, has direct implications for 
strategies seeking to curb it, in particular Forest Law Enforcement and Governance 
initiatives. Where small-scale activities are predominant and authority is contested, 
higher fines and an expansion of the powers held by law enforcement officers are 
obviously inappropriate measures. Crackdowns often target villagers and small 
operators, rarely reaching those who are well connected and politically protected 
(Casson and Obidzinski, 2002; Colchester, 2006). Even worse, they may solidify the 
grip of powerful actors over the timber trade, as illustrated by our case. In contrast, 
there is a need to reform forest regulations and empower villagers as a way of 
redressing the entrenched power differences between villagers, on the one hand, and 
local powerbrokers and traders on the other (Colchester, 2006). Forest law reforms 
would have to modify the blanket criminalization of commercial forest use, as has 
happened in the form of logging bans. They would need to facilitate small-scale 
forest use by lowering the technical requirements for forest management plans and 
creating access to markets for villagers (Richards et al., 2003). In addition, non-
governmental organizations could help form coalitions and associations of small 
forest operators as counterweights to the influence of powerful logging networks. At 
the same time, central and local governments would need to monitor forest use and 
trade to safeguard central interests. In this way, Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance initiatives could promote a system of checks and balances that leads to 
better forest management and mitigates the risk of powerful actors overtrumping 
villagers in the rush for forest benefits.  
  
At the same time, strategies tackling illegal logging will only receive support from 
central governments and national publics if they take their concerns into account. 
These concerns may call for steps to strengthen the authority of central governments 
over forests through two approaches. The first approach involves placing as much 
emphasis on local people’s livelihoods as on environmental protection, as key goals 
in forest management (cf. Colchester, 2006). International organizations and 
domestic NGOs can promote a broader understanding of forest law, incorporating 
attention to human and indigenous rights, and can try to bring forest agencies into 
broader debates about rural livelihoods and poverty alleviation (ibid.). The second 
approach seeks to enhance the legitimacy of public concerns and central government 
authority over forests. Suitable initiatives include further international agreements 
and coordinated action to bolster the legitimacy of central government and public 
concerns related to forest management (Richards et al., 2003). Domestically, 
awareness campaigns and possibly the establishment of a central monitoring unit 
may increase the visibility of these concerns, especially if these are combined with 
the establishment of a central forest inspectorate accessible to local people and high-
profile court cases against particularly egregious cases of illegal forest use practices 
(Smith et al., 2003). 
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The crucial element, therefore, in understanding the dynamics of illegal logging and 
devising strategies against illegal activities is to recognize the presence of the two 
interrelated dynamics and their mutual constitution. Illegal logging is so visible and 
high on the policy agenda because of what is happening with forests on the ground 
and due to struggles about authority over forests at the national level. Strategies 
designed with a singular focus on the political economy of actual forest use may not 
find sufficient support from central governments and national publics. Similarly, 
strategies that exclusively concentrate on strengthening the legitimacy of public and 
central government concerns may not cause much change in practice. In other 
words, singular strategies bear the risk that illegal logging will not go away, either in 
practice or in talk about practice.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 “Illegal logging” is a very problematic term, as it relates to contested notions of legality and 
legitimacy, as this paper shows.  In this paper, we use the term “illegal logging” to refer to a 
particular discourse about social dynamics driving logging.  We speak of illegal operations when we 
consider logging practices deemed illegal by statutory legislation. 
2 The following discussion presents rather stylized summaries of the frameworks. Our objective is to 
point out characteristic differences between them, ignoring overlaps and similarities. We do not 
imply, however, that the actual Forest Law Enforcement and Governance initiative neatly falls into 
one of the three frameworks. Nor do the references to particular documents mean to suggest that the 
analyses and recommendations presented in these are confined to a particular framework. 
3 The discussion in this paragraph is informed by the discussion of corruption in Gupta (1995). 
4 A more complete analysis of illegal logging would need to take account of larger economic forces, 
such as the rising urban demand for timber (McElwee, 2004) and the influence of China (Lang and 
Chan, 2006), but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 The fieldwork took the form of several extended stays in the village from 2000 to 2005, totaling 
approximately nine months. It included interviews and conversations with all involved actors. 
6 The characteristics include significant human pressure on forests because a significant share of the 
rural population lives in poverty; large concessions not in the hands of the private sector but held by 
State Forest Enterprises; a single party closely tied with the government; and fact that the government 
draws much of its legitimacy from its support by rural people (Kerkvliet, 2005). 
7 Vietnam had a Ministry of Forestry until 1995, when it was merged into the new Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. 
8 Another indicator of significant decentralization was the failure of repeated attempts by the central 
government to reform the State Forest Enterprises managed by provincial authorities. By the early 
2000s, the Enterprises held on to most of their land, which they were supposed to transfer to local 
households, and defied central orders to reform their management structures (World Bank, 2005). 
9 Did logging increase after the logging ban?  This is an interesting question, although it is impossible 
to answer it due to lack of suitable data. 
10 This figure includes illegal logging in Vietnam as well as illegal imports from Cambodia and Laos. 
11 For example, see the articles posted on the news website www.vnexpress.net from 27 August 2006 
and 26 February and 29 May 2007.  
12 For example, our search for reports on illegal operations involving local state officials published 
between March and July 2007 turned up articles on the website www.vnexpress.net on 22 March, 7 
July, and 17 July and in the newspaper Lao Dong on 11 April, 2 July, and 17 July. 
13 For reasons of confidentiality we use pseudonyms for the names of all people and local places in 
this paper.  
14 The Muong are an ethnic group in Vietnam. 
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15 Other wood traders also who came to Ban Chanh and offered to buy logs. Yet villagers rarely sold 
to them, as they preferred selling logs to Anh Nga (see below). 
16 It is interesting to note that the kiem lam did not try to stop villagers from extracting trees but 
concentrated their efforts on controlling the timber trade. One possible explanation is that kiem lam 
officers have little incentive to prevent people from cutting trees. It is much more lucrative for them to 
pursue traders and transporters, as that strategy allows them to either exact high bribe from these or 
to sell confiscated logs (McElwee, 2004). 
17 For example, one traffic police officer showed us his baton and asked: “Do you know how much 
this stick cost?”  He answered the question himself: “40 million dong” – that is, 2,500 US$. 
